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THE FALL OF “AUGUSTINIAN ADAM”: ORIGINAL
FRAGILITY AND SUPRALAPSARIAN PURPOSE
by John Schneider
Abstract.
This essay is framed by conflict between Christianity
and Darwinian science over the history of the world and the
nature of original human personhood. Evolutionary science narrates
a long prehuman geological and biological history filled with vast
amounts, kinds, and distributions of apparently random brutal and
pointless suffering. It has also unveiled an original human person
with animal psychosomatic heredity. This narrative seems to discredit
Christianity’s (Augustinian) metanarrative of the Fall—Paradise Lost
and Paradise Regained. The author contends that the Augustinian
story and its character of Adam are implausible, anyway, for reasons
of theology and apologetics. He proposes that Christians adopt instead
a Supralapsarian metaphysics of original human personhood and
existence that grows from the intuitions of Irenaeus. The outcome
will be improved Christian theology, more persuasive theodicy, and,
above all, peace with Darwinian science
Keywords:
theodicy

aesthetics; the Fall; Irenaeus; Supralapsarianism;

PEACE IN THE VALLEY OF DARWIN?
Influential philosophers and theologians have tried very hard to assure
everyone concerned that supposed conflicts between Christianity and
Darwinism are greatly exaggerated, especially by “new atheists,” who
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promote the opinion that evolutionary science has discredited theistic
religion in general, and Christianity, in particular, once and for all.
Meanwhile, on the other side of the presumed conflicts, a considerable
population of Christians (many of them in the United States) see
Christianity’s revelation (as they interpret it) as discrediting all or parts
of evolutionary science (as they understand it). Amid the intensifying
hostilities, an impressive cadre of mediators has grown into something like
a diplomatic corps promoting terms of peace.
For instance, Michael Ruse (who is an agnostic), and several notable
Christian writers, such as Karl Giberson, Denis Alexander, Alvin Plantinga,
and John Polkinghorne, have become known for their arguments
downplaying the supposed conflicts, and supporting amicable dialogue
(Alexander 2008; Giberson 2008; Plantinga 2011; Polkinghorne 2011;
Ruse 2001, 2010). They all promise that with relatively minor adjustments,
the prospects of peace for Christians in the valley of Darwin are good.
However, as things currently stand, the promise seems premature—for
two main sorts of reasons, one of which I will but briefly discuss, if only to
have it in the background. The second reason (to be disclosed) will be the
main subject of the essay.
All the above-named writers seem sanguine about the road that leads
to harmony. For instance, Plantinga proposes that taking it requires two
pretty straightforward things. First, we need only think of Christianity
in a certain way, as “circumscribed by the rough intersection of the great
Christian creeds,” or as pruned down to the essentials of something like the
“Mere Christianity” that C. S. Lewis made famous (Lewis 2001; Plantinga
2011, 8 ). Second, he proposes that we need only think about evolutionary
science in a certain way—as consisting of several connected “theses.” He
suggests that evolutionary theory normally consists of six distinct theses.
They are (1) the thesis of an ancient earth, (2) the progress thesis (life
has progressed from the simple to the complex), (3) the thesis of descent
with modification (offspring differing from parents), (4) the thesis of
common ancestry from a single cell, (5) natural selection (which he calls
“Darwinism,” the selection of traits via random mutations and survival of
the fittest for reproduction), and (6) the thesis of naturalistic origins—that
is, that life itself originated from natural processes (Plantinga 2011, 8–9).
Plantinga believes that we can affirm evolution without the last two theses,
so he is left with a sort of Mere Darwinism consisting of the first four
(Plantinga 2011, 10). He goes on to explain why, in his view, provided we
think of Christianity and evolution in these ways, no real or “deep” conflict
exists, but only conflicts that are relatively “superficial” (Plantinga 2011,
Pt. 2).
Now, there will be agitated hand waving on at least the Christian side
upon hearing these definitional constraints. (We will ignore possible hand
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waving at the treatment of thesis (5) natural selection, on the other side).
For one thing, that huge population of Christians just mentioned cannot in
good faith simply prune their Christianity down in the way that Plantinga
proposes they must do. That is because they adhere religiously and devoutly
to doctrines that lie outside the intersecting lines of Mere Christianity, so that
for them Mere Christianity does not qualify as a sufficient summary of true
Christianity, as they formulate and profess it. They add other “essentials,”
such as the “inerrancy” of the Bible, the doctrine of a young earth, or the
miraculous creation of human beings. These doctrines, and some others,
are often sources of glaring conflict with evolutionary science, and unless
the adherents give up those doctrines, it is hard to see how the conflicts
could ever be resolved.
Plantinga does acknowledge the concerns of those Christians (Plantinga
2011, 10–11). However, he treats them almost in passing at the beginning
of the book and gives the impression, at least, of not quite sensing the
religious depth of those conflicts. Many of these believers feel that giving
away those doctrines would amount to a betrayal of the faith itself, and
that is a powerful prohibition against the requisite change, and it is a
source of great inhibition about even entering the discussion of maybe
doing so. In order to take the matter head on, one must dig into depths
of the applied hermeneutics of Scripture, together with their intuitively
skeptical epistemology of science. And one must go still more deeply into
the cultural and psychological sources of ingrained dispositions toward the
Bible, and into the particular concepts of inspiration that they apply to
it. As anyone who has taken on this work knows, it is tough going, and
it is a real job to get the Christians in question to go comfortably along
with the inquiry, or to find their way through to the promised peace with
Darwin.
So that is one reason for thinking that the promises seem a little too
sanguine. However, it is not the reason I wish to pursue in this essay. I will
for now only commend the writings of others who have done so already.
Some have written ably on the hermeneutics of creationists (Enns 2012;
Harlow 2010; Walton 2009), others on their skeptical epistemology of
science (Haarsma and Haarsma 2007; Lamoureux 2009; Young and Searley
2008). And William J. Abraham, building on the pioneering works of James
Barr on the Bible’s authority, proposed that evangelical hermeneutics (and
the prohibitions against embracing science and historical criticism) have
grown from confusion on the concept of inspiration, which they have
unconsciously treated as a species of divine speaking (Abraham 1981; Barr
1980). To this day, that proposal still awaits the attention it deserves. Even
the most admirable writings of evangelicals on the Bible, such as the recent
book by Kenton Sparks, seem not yet to have realized the conceptual error
and corrected it (Sparks 2008).
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Meanwhile, the focus of the essay henceforth will be on a source of
deep Christian conflict with Darwinism that is anything but narrow
or parochial. It arises from Christian doctrine that is embedded in the
confessional, theological, evangelistic, and apologetic presentations of all
the historic versions of Christianity—a source of conflict with evolution
that is embedded in Mere Christianity. The central source is the traditional
Christian story of the Fall. It is true that there are two main traditions of
telling that story in Christendom. One of our proposals is that the version
that prevailed in Eastern Orthodoxy, reaching back to Irenaeus of Lyon
(died circa 200 C.E.) is much more amenable to harmony with Darwinism
than the version that has prevailed in the Catholic and Protestant West.
That version descends mainly from Augustine of Hippo (354–430 C.E.),
and it is our main subject of criticism. It is a story of Paradise Lost and
Paradise Regained that has framed Christian theology and proclamation in
the West for so long that we are barely aware anymore that it is a version
of the Genesis story, and not the story itself. Unfortunately (so we believe),
among other defects (to be visited), it is a source of not-so-superficial
conflict with Darwinism.

THE DARWINIAN WORLD
I believe that in order to have a sufficient working conception of
Darwinism, we need to add two theses to the essentials of Plantinga’s
‘‘Mere Darwinism.’’ First, we need a thesis that captures the way in which
the theory of evolution depicts the empirical character of the world through
planetary and biological time. The time span is not just extremely long—
unfathomably so. Evolutionary science has also unveiled a narrative of
events that seem to have no unifying sense, to begin with, which look
more like a disunited series of “worlds,” rather than the unfolding of just
one world, or cosmos. The Darwinian World, as I will call it, seems to
violate what Whitehead and others have considered aesthetic norms for a
sufficiently good world (Whitehead 1996). But furthermore, the course of
this history has included vast amounts of apparently random waste and
seemingly pointless suffering for both human and nonhuman animals.
Evolutionary thesis (7), the Darwinian World, depicts the planetary and
biological past as one in which entire biomes have come and gone in
apparently purposeless and brutal fashion, and reveals that ours is merely
one of them. In his recent book Nature Red in Tooth and Claw, Murray
ably describes the deep conflict that this depiction creates for Christian
theism. Was this wrought by a loving and kind God (Murray 2008, 1–9)?
The thesis (7) of a Darwinian World is a source of conflict in its
own right, and the problem of natural evils and the vast amounts, kinds,
and distributions of suffering in the design of existence for animals and
hominids is getting more attention than it once did (Murray 2008, 5).
Richard Dawkins sees it as providing prima facie grounds for atheism
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(Dawkins 1996, 132), and various defenders of theism are just now
beginning to get arguments off the ground (Murphy et al. 2007). However,
the thesis of a Darwinian World also contributes indirectly to another
conflict—conflict between Darwinism and Christianity on the nature of
human existence and personhood. It does so if we think of it as coupled
with yet another thesis (8), the Darwinian Adam, or Darwinism’s depiction
of existence and personhood for the first modern human beings.
To borrow a theatrical analogy, the Darwinian World seems to discredit
the existential sense and explanatory power of Christianity’s entire stage
play in three great acts—the creation, the Fall, and redemption through
Christ. Whatever the explanation for this prehuman history of apparently
random, pointless waste and suffering—the Devil meddling with laws of
nature before humans appeared (Boyd 2001, 293–319; Lewis 1962, Ch. 9;
Plantinga 1974a, 57–9), or as the inevitable byproduct of a lawful universe
(Murphy et al. 2007)—the explanatory problem persists. The Darwinian
World just is not a stage set for any plausible production of the traditional
Christian script on human origins and the human condition in the world.
Furthermore, evolutionary thesis (8) the Darwinian Adam makes the
matter of staging and casting considerably worse.

THE DARWINIAN ADAM
What sort of human person was the very first modern human being,
the Darwinian Adam? What sort of human personhood should we think
had emerged from the selective genetic and environmental descent from
nonhuman animals? What would the psychosomatic heredity of Darwinian
Adam (and Eve) have been like? Recent genomic science enhances our
ability to piece together a portrait of primary human personhood from
older clues about the Darwinian Adam.
Perhaps the first thing to consider is that genomic science—after
mapping of the human genome—strongly supports a polygenetic account
of human origins. Geneticists calculate mutation rates leading them to
believe that the current human population descends from somewhere
between 1,000 and 20,000 original breeding human pairs with “Genesis”
occurring in Africa between 100,000 and two 200,000 years ago (Cann
et al. 1987).
As for the Darwinian Adam and original human personhood , common
ancestry taken together with recent behavioral studies of other species
supports the thinking that many human moral intuitions—both toward
virtues and vices—are homologous (come from a common source) (Domning 2006, 102–3). In other words Darwinian Adam was endowed with
an animal psychosomatic genetic and social heredity that would have made
“him” a morally equivocal sort of person. In his book Original Selfishness,
the Catholic anthropologist Daryl Domning provides a fascinating account
of this primary human personhood (Domning 2006). Other writers, such
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as Ruse and Christian de Duve, have also explored Christian applications
of Dawkins’s thesis in The Selfish Gene, which is that the core of human
morality is genetically designed interest in the preservation and prosperity
of the individual self, as for all members of species (Dawkins 1996; de
Duve 2009, 149–50; Ruse 2001, 205–6).
These explorations all suppose, however, that the first human beings
could not plausibly have emerged in utopian natural conditions, nor could
they have been at all morally mature, much less spiritually regal, as in
traditional Christian teaching on Adam and Eve. Indeed, it seems that a
greatly enlarged and more neurally complex brain enabled unprecedented
degrees of self-consciousness and reflective emotion and judgments on the
“goodness” or “badness” of actions and states of affairs (de Duve 2009,
124–5). With this “main frame,” reflective morality could begin to evolve,
as it has done, even into forms of altruism, but this had to have been a long
process (Ruse 2001, 191–204). According to evolutionary theory, anyway,
human beings developed complex languages only after tens of thousands
of years (de Duve 2009, 114).
So the thesis (8) of a Darwinian Adam, together with the other theses
of ancestry, selection, and the Darwinian World, support seeing original
human personhood as a powerhouse of potential for unrivaled intellectual
and moral achievement. Amid the dangerous yet rich Darwinian World,
natural selection and common ancestry would have endowed Darwinian
Adam with “virtuous” traits “such as solidarity, cooperativeness, tolerance,
compassion, and altruism, up to personal sacrifice for the common good”
(de Duve 2009, 147). On the other hand, they would have also inscribed
reflexive traits that promised success at competition for territory, food, and
mates at both the levels of individual personhood and that of the collective
social dispositions of nuclear groups (de Duve 2009 148–50) .
Imagining the Darwinian World has taken us a long way from the
Neolithic scene in Genesis, written in that setting no doubt because for
practical purposes, for those human beings, that is the time when the
“world” as they knew it began (Hurd 2003, 233; Wilcox 2003, 244). But
more deeply, the Darwinian Adam bears little if any spiritual and moral
resemblance to the counterpart in the Bible—as understood in prevailing
Christian tradition in the West. That tradition reaches back mainly to the
formative influence of Augustine, as already mentioned. Henceforth we
refer to it generally as the Augustinian Adam, which has been the leading
character on the Christian stage in the Catholic and Protestant West, and
still has command of Christian center stage. So long as the Augustinian
Adam has the stage, however, it will obviously be very hard for Christians
who endorse evolutionary science to maintain the aesthetic and religious
integrity of their main production. In my view, trying to do so only
makes matters worse—it is too much like trying to pound a square peg
into a round hole. Before looking at the major alternative—the Irenaean
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Adam—we must look more closely at the Augustinian character and then
see what a poor fit it is on the evolutionary stage.

THE AUGUSTINIAN ADAM
When Augustine wrote his great commentary on Genesis (Genesis Taken
Literally) he obviously had many things on his mind besides just wanting
to gloss a biblical book (Taylor 1982, 1–4). He was worried that Christian
commentators caved in too quickly to criticism of the Old Testament by
sophisticates, such as Platonists, Manicheans, and others who thought the
Jewish depiction of God was crude and unworthy of belief (Taylor 1982,
1–2). Although he admitted that in the end the “literal sense” gave forth
more questions than answers, Augustine worried that the common strategy
of allegorizing one’s way out was weakening Christianity’s appeal to the
whole Bible as being a revelation from God (Taylor 1982, 3–4).
Augustine riddled the commentary with attempts to resolve apparent
conflicts between Genesis and science, especially on cosmology. He
lambasted Christians who used Genesis 1: 5–7, which seems to describe a
flat earth covered by a solid ceiling, as a means of ridiculing Greek science,
which taught that the earth was a sphere. On the contrary, he warned, it
was the Flat Earth Creationists who were ridiculous and whose ignorance
was an embarrassment to the entire Gospel of Christ. He urged church
leaders to do whatever was within their power to stop the embarrassment
(Augustine 1982, Ch. 19, 39).
Perhaps the main purpose, though, was to improve upon previous
attempts to interpret Genesis allegorically against the Manicheans, who
poured scorn on the Old Testament God for being the agent of all sorts
of imperfections and evils. This purpose apparently also coincided with
desire to make his anti-Pelagian views more plausible morally than they
seemed, even to Augustine himself, as we shall briefly observe in another
section. In both contexts, it was all important to lay the blame for evils
entirely on creatures, and none of it on God. We can safely rely on the great
historian of doctrine, J. N. D. Kelly to relate the main ideas, which are well
known to students of Augustine and uncontroversial so far as his views on
the subject are concerned.
Kelly summarizes it as follows: “It is clear from Augustine’s account that
the fault was entirely his [Adam’s] own. God could not be blamed, for he
had given him every advantage . . . . Any blame must lie exclusively with
his own will, which though inclined toward goodness, had the possibility,
being free, of choosing wrongfully” (Kelly 2004, 362).
With this metaphysical purpose, it would not be enough to say merely
that Adam was originally good (Eve comes later), and/or innocent of having
yet done anything wrong, as Irenaeus said (see below). Those descriptions of
original human personhood would not be enough to generate the quality
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of culpability that Augustine’s intended explanations required. The first
human beings had to have been in possession of very great knowledge
(including a grasp of how consequential disobeying was) and in a position
of supreme moral advantage (full inclination and power to choose to
obey instead). Otherwise, their disobedience could not justly merit the
world-ruining and humanity-ruining consequences that followed. It had,
therefore, to be an ultimate instance of “how the mighty are fallen.” or else,
on the scales of justice, God would not be good.
As Kelly observes, Augustine’s Adam was a mighty man. Augustine
“carries to its highest pitch the growing tendency to attribute original
righteousness and perfection to the first man” (Kelly 2004, 362). The
Augustinian Adam was “immune from physical ills and had surpassing
intellectual gifts; he was in a state of justification, illumination and
beatitude. Immortality lay within his grasp if only he continued to feed
on the Tree of Life” (Kelly 2004, 362). And yet in this beatific physical
and spiritual condition, the Augustinian Adam was morally free, not in
the sense of inability to sin (non posse peccare which Augustine regards
as the true liberty enjoyed by saints in heaven), but in the sense of the
ability either to sin or not to sin (posse non peccare)” (Kelly 2004, 362).
“Able to sin,” and yet “his will was good, that is, devoted to carrying out
God’s commands, for God endowed it with a settled inclination to virtue.
So his body was subject to his soul, his carnal desires to his will, and his
will to God” (Kelly 2004, 362). Augustine imagined Adam as “wrapped
around by divine grace (indumentum gratiae), and he was further granted
the special gift of perseverance, that is, the possibility of persisting in the
right exercise of his will” (Kelly 2004, 362).
The major theologians of both Catholicism and Protestantism followed
Augustine in this way of depicting the first human beings and in thereby
keeping us from “passing the buck” of blame for evils back to God. In
his comprehensive account of “original righteousness” in Christian history,
Charles Hodge showed that all Catholic and Protestant writers affirmed
the doctrine with minor differences (Hodge 1965, 99–107). All of them
followed the lead of Aquinas in specifying the original virtues as growing
from a core of faith, hope, and love, and in seeing those virtues as infused
in our first parents by supernatural grace (Hodge 1965, 101). There is no
need to go on listing similar superlatives in the Protestant writings, which
differ only (some of them) in extending the infusions to Adam’s “lower
nature.”

COUNTING THE COST
In a scathing review of Enns’s book, The Evolution of Adam (in which
Enns expresses doubt that such a figure of Adam (or Eve) ever existed
in fact), James K. A. Smith challenges us to count the cost. He roundly
rejects Enns’s contention that we need not have an explanation of how sin
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originated in order to embrace the Gospel, which requires only that we
admit that condition and turn to Christ. So Smith: “Unfortunately, that’s
just not the case. Because if we don’t have an account of the origin of sin
we will end up making God the author of evil—a thesis that has been
persistently and strenuously rejected by the orthodox Christian tradition”
(Smith 2012). By not “taking a stand on the origin of sin,” Smith reasons,
one fails “to recognize that what is at stake is the goodness of God. And
if the goodness of God is not central to the Gospel, I don’t know what
is”(Smith 2012).
Smith obviously means taking an Augustinian-Calvinist sort of stand
on the origin of sin, and we suppose that by “making God the author of
evil” he means more precisely, “making God culpable of evil,” or “making
God a doer of evil.” It happens that there are contexts in which moral
agents “authorize” the occurrence of evils for reasons that render the agents
morally inculpable, so the one hardly follows logically from the other
without explanation. At any rate, Smith’s main thought is that without
the Augustinian-Calvinistic explanation of evils (in some version) we are
bound to depict God as morally imperfect, which of course would be to
demolish theism, and to engage in something like sacrilege. We will come
back to this line of reasoning (and religious rebuke) before the end, and
explain why we think it is seriously mistaken. For now, though, our point
is that those Christians who stand firmly in the Augustinian tradition on
origins are urgently motivated to keep the character of Augustinian Adam
on stage at all costs, even if the stage we approve is Darwinian. Smith speaks
for many others along these lines, as does John Collins. “Specifically, if we
deny that all people have a common source that was originally good [by this
he means the Augustinian “good”] . . . then the existence of sin becomes
God’s fault . . . ” (Collins 2011, 134).
For Christians to make the existence of sin God’s “fault” would of course
be theologically wrongheaded and a religiously irreverent thing to do. Only
a very misguided or perverse Christian would knowingly do it, we suppose.
Unfortunately, trying to use the Augustinian script and character of Adam
in order to thwart the impropriety in defense of God’s goodness only makes
things worse.

THE IMPLAUSIBLE PLOT
Collins, who is a scholar of the Old Testament and an Old Earth
Creationist, has given a useful summary of the various attempts to keep
an Augustinian Adam in an essentially Darwinian scientific script (Collins
2011, 121–31). He discusses the proposals of Fazale Rana, John Stott,
Derek Kidner, Denis Alexander, and C. S. Lewis. He might have also
included the scenario put forward by Peter van Inwagen, who is an
influential Catholic philosopher of religion (below) (van Inwagen 2004).
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Despite differences, they all seek to preserve the Augustinian depiction of
the first human persons as endowed by God with preternatural spiritual
and moral gifts (Collins 2011, 123–29).
Alexander’s scenario perhaps holds out the best hope for success at
salvaging the Augustinian script, because it is by far the most thorough
and detailed in trying to make a mainly evolutionary story hold together
in Augustinian Christian terms.
In his otherwise very useful book (in introducing evolutionary science
lucidly to nonexperts), Alexander (director of the Farraday Institute at
Cambridge) considers three “Models” for getting the traditional Fall into
a Darwinian story (which he wholeheartedly accepts to the extent he can).
Models A and B, which he treats with some sympathy, take the Genesis
story as mythical, and as having no real relevance to the facts and sequence
of events in Darwinism (Alexander 2008, 235–6). He tentatively, but
pretty clearly, favors Model C, in which the Genesis episode refers to
events of history (including the relevant Neolithic Mesopotamian scene),
albeit written appropriately in ancient idiomatic form (Alexander 2008,
236–7). Alexander seems moved to prefer this model by Paul’s references
to Adam in Romans 5, which Alexander reads to describe (for Paul) a
historical person (Alexander 2008, 241). I choose to bypass this (I believe)
questionable reasoning on Paul and Adam in order to get directly to the
main aspects of his “Model C.”
The heart of his model is that “God in his grace chose a couple of
Neolithic farmers in the Near East, or maybe a community of farmers,
to whom he chose to reveal himself in a special way, calling them into
fellowship with himself—so that they might know him as a personal God”
(Alexander, 236). Alexander names these newly awakened physiologically
human beings homo divinus, “the divine humans, those who knew the one
true God, the Adam and Eve of the Genesis account.” (Alexander 2008,
237) These people, he reasons, were “the first humans who were truly
spiritually alive in fellowship with God, providing the roots of the Jewish
faith” (Alexander 2008, 237).
Two points arise already in the model’s disfavor. One is that it depicts
God as having put nonhuman and human animals through the brutal
formative history of evolution, and all God got for the “cruciform” price of
their suffering was a semihuman anatomically modern hominid. In order to
get a fully human person none of this sufficed—God had still to intervene,
God still has to get out the “fairy dust” in order to get creatures capable of
the spiritual things that God was aiming at all along. I think all the animals
and humans who suffered excruciatingly along the way, most all of them to
extinction, would be right to protest in the way Young Earth Creationists,
like Henry Morris, have done. If God was going to create miraculously
anyway, what could conceivably justify the unfathomable amounts, kinds,
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and distributions of suffering, not to mention the unimaginable waste?
(Morris 1970).
The second point is also theological. In the scenario that Alexander
envisages God places the destiny of every human being in the hands of two
“born again” farmers. God left it entirely up to them to determine whether
the base metaphor of human history would become Disney World (God’s
aim, we suppose) or rather Dachau (as it happened). Alexander demurs
from describing the preternatural gifts that would have qualified them for
this awesome responsibility, and also from the precise nature of the evil they
did, or why. It seems the script is already at risk of self-defeat by making
God into the one morally responsible for the catastrophic outcome after
all. That is of course intolerable, because the whole point of preserving the
character was to protect God from that very thing.
To explain, Alexander appeals to the traditional reformed doctrine of
Federal Headship. God made the two selected and renovated farmers
together “the federal head of the whole of humanity alive at that
time . . . chosen by God to be the representatives of his new spiritual family
on earth” (Alexander 2008, 237). To illumine the appeal morally, he likens
Federal Headship to an imaginary scheme by the United Nations, in which
they sponsor an international competition. Under developed nations each
select a man and woman to represent them in a quiz show, the winners
will acquire a top university for their needy nation, and they will be
academic heads of the enterprise (Alexander 2008, 238). He admits that
the “analogy is not perfect,” but thinks that it nonetheless illustrates how
“in the lives of Adam and Eve, the way is opened for any person anywhere
in the world to enter God’s family by faith and obedience” (Alexander
2008, 239). What we need, however, is an analogy for failure. What if the
authorities penalized all the people in the nations whose representatives lost
the contest, perhaps by taking away the meager schools they already had?
On this sort of analogy, all appeals to Federal Headship (not just this one)
have the theological self-defeat that Smith and Collins fear securely within
sight. The analogy makes God conspicuously morally inept. Since Collins
himself appeals to Federal headship, one is inclined to invoke the proverb
advising people who live in glass houses not to throw stones (Collins 2011,
130–31).
The theological-moral trouble worsens when we consider the real-world
workings of the ruinously radiating consequences. Alexander imagines a
population worldwide of between 1 and 10 million (unenlightened modern
human beings going about their lives). Meanwhile, in Mesopotamia,
unbeknownst to any of them (unlike the U.N. analogy of representation)
Homo divinus stopped praying and singing praise songs and defied the
command of God. How should we think their defiance could have
spiritually destructive effects on all the others everywhere? Alexander
proposes that we think of it on another analogy—the analogy of a hydrogen
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bomb going off, “with ferocious force, scattering radiation around the
world, so sin entered the world with the first deliberate disobedience to
God’s commands, spreading the spiritual contamination around the world”
(Alexander 2008, 255). We can but wonder what exactly happened to those
people, and what they could have thought was suddenly and unexpectedly
happening to them. Again, I submit that we subject the story’s plausibility
to intuitions about the power, wisdom, and goodness of God.
By pressing it back to the very first humans, Lewis and van Inwagen
tell more elegant stories of an Augustinian Fall in evolutionary terms,
but perhaps mainly because they do not explore details as forthrightly as
Alexander does. However, their common way of developing the character
of the first human beings succumbs to a line of criticism that is arguably
more devastating than the previous ones, because it seems that the personal
development of that character is historically implausible in the extreme.
(This is not the outcome of conflict with science, by the way; it is just that
the modern staging helps to bring the implausibility into clearer relief than
otherwise.)

IMPLAUSIBLE CHARACTERS
In The Problem of Pain, Lewis invites us to imagine that God selected
two (or perhaps more) biologically human beings and awakened them to
awareness of themselves and to spiritual and moral realities (Lewis 1962,
77). God endowed this Paradisal Man with supernatural powers—“he was
all consciousness,” like a “yogi,” had “full control of his bodily functions,
he chose his appetites, the length of his life may have been up to his own
discretion, he possessed powers of command over animals” (Lewis 1962,
77). Further, Lewis proposes that “God came first in his love, and in his
thought,” so that his constant experience was “perfectly enacting in joy
and ease of all the faculties and the senses that filial surrender which our
Lord enacted in the agonies of the crucifixion” (Lewis 1962, 79). In other
words, the Paradisal Man was Christ-like in love for God, fellow human
beings, and for all things.
Similarly, van Inwagen offers a hypothetical version of the Fall story
that is compatible with the existence of evils and yet “presents us with no
particular reasons to believe that this story is false” (van Inwagen 2004, 68).
His story assumes that God “guided the course of evolution so as eventually
to produce certain very clever primates,” who formed a “geographically
tightly knit group” (van Inwagen 2004, 68). In “the fullness of time” God
“raised them to rationality,” gave them “gifts of language, abstract thought,
and disinterested love,” and also “the gift of free will” which was essential
to love (van Inwagen 2004, 69). God took these creatures into “a kind of
mystical union with himself,” into a spiritual state of what Christians call
“the Beatific Vision.” These first humans lived “in the harmony of perfect
love,” and they also possessed “what theologians used to call preternatural
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powers,” enabling them “to protect themselves from wild beasts (which
they were able to tame with a word), from disease (which they were able to
cure with a touch), and from random natural events (such as earthquakes)”
(van Inwagen 2004, 69). But then—somehow—disaster struck. Despite
the fact that “There was no evil in their world,” it happened that “somehow,
in some way that must remain mysterious to us, they were not content
with this paradisal state. They abused the gift of free will and separated
themselves from union with God” (van Inwagen 2004, 69–70).
Aside from criticisms already lodged about the aesthetic and explanatory
defects of these Augustinian “plays” within the larger Darwinian “Play,”
I think we indeed do have at least three particular reasons to think that
the Augustinian storyline itself is false, that its plot is implausible in its
self-designated genre of history.
One reason is that no evidence exists anywhere in the geological or
genomic record to support believing that there ever were super-human
beings like this on the planet. One could claim that the Genesis story in
the Bible counts as “evidence,” but that is not just unacceptably parochial,
limiting the last word on the science of origins to the Christian. Even as
a Christian territorial claim, it is presumptuous, since at least one other
interpretation of the Genesis story exists as an alternative. Good theological
reasons exist to prefer it to the Augustinian reading (see below on Adam in
Irenaeus).
Another reason is that character development in these scenarios is
historically implausible in the extreme. We do have some ability to assess
the psychology of people who have supposedly had “beatific” experiences
of God, and even imperfect, fallen persons in that condition simply do
not behave in the way that the Augustinian Adam supposedly did. The
objection is as ancient as Augustine himself, and even he did not dismiss
the question. He understood that. God could have created human beings
in a better condition, so that could not sin, and would be like God and
the saints in heaven (Augustine 1982, Ch. 7–11). He understood that
ignorance of one’s moral future was incompatible with beatitude in Eden
(Augustine 1982, Ch. 18). And so he understood that there indeed was
“a more serious problem to be considered” (Augustine 1982, Ch. 42, 58,
175). “If Adam was a spiritual man, in mind though not in body, how could
he have believed what was said through the serpent?” (Augustine 1982, Ch.
42, 58, 175). His best answer was that the woman (not in God’s image)
was deceived, and the power of love for the woman induced the man to sin
(Augustine 1982, Ch. 42, 58–60, 175–6). As is better known, Augustine
wished to trace this all back to Pride, but he failed to explain what would
have been the ultimate in self-deception—pride welling up in someone
existing in perfect union with God—was even marginally possible. And
since in his explanation the welling up of Pride was the source of the first
sin (Augustine 1982, Ch. 15), the plausibility of the entire character breaks
down.
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Unfortunately the second reason to think the story false leads to a third
one. It is that in order to fall in the fashion supposed, the first human
beings had to have been spiritually fragile in some key respect. Augustine
also understood this much, and he speculated, along the lines of his mature
theology of predestination, that God created them in that fragile (albeit
good) condition knowing they would fall, and that this would create a
whole population of humans worthy of damnation. This in turn would
set the stage for divine election, and the creation of another, better kind
of human being—one that could not sin. In so doing, God would have
occasion to display both aspects of God’s glory—his justice in punishing
the damned, and his mercy in blessing the selected saints (Augustine 1982,
Ch. 7–11). Unless we think this explanation depicts the character of God
as ontologically and morally good , it looks like the like the logic of the
Augustinian story leads to making God the “author of evil,” after all,
which of course defeats the entire religious and apologetic point of the plot
in the first place (so Smith, Collins, and others).

BEATIFIC PERSONHOOD AND ORIGINAL FRAGILITY
So it seems that supporters of the Augustinian story face a dilemma.
Either one has the implausible character of someone blessed with “beatific
personhood” developing in the most arrogant and irrationally wicked
fashion possible (meriting the magnitude of the consequences). Or one
concedes an original fragility of personhood to make the character
development plausible, but in so doing make God seem to be the one
most responsible for their breakdown. Before going forward to deal with
implications of original fragility, and an alternative view, I wish to make
the first horn of the alleged dilemma a little more secure.
In discussing the Fall Murray engages the Paradisal Motivation Problem
(Murray 2008, 84–7). How could anyone in Paradise have the motivation
to want anything more (Murray 2008, 84)? The Paradisal Problem, as
we are formulating it, poses an even more formidable question. How
could anyone enjoying Beatific Personhood possibly become arrogant to
the extent of defying God, self-deceived to the extent of seeing this as
good rather than completely evil, a better existential course and not the
ruination of everything? In other writings, van Inwagen has defended a
dispositional view of moral action, that is, that for any moral action the
agent must already have a “pro disposition” to perform that action, good
or bad. On this view, for any bad action, there is a “pro disposition” to
perform that action (van Inwagen 1989, 1994). (Maybe it is not a mystery
why in his story of the Fall, van Inwagen writes in passing that the reason
why such beatific persons went wrong “must be mysterious to us,” instead
of applying his own dispositional theory.)
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Lewis and Plantinga offer versions of Augustine’s appeal to Pride, but I
do not think they escape the dilemma of beatific evil. Lewis wrote:
Such a sin [pride] requires no complex social conditions, no extended experience,
no great intellectual development. From the moment a creature becomes aware of
God as God and of itself as self, the terrible alternative of choosing God or self
for the centre is open to it. This sin is committed daily by young children and
ignorant peasants as well as by sophisticated persons, by solitaries no less than by
those who live in society: it is the fall in every individual life, and in each day in
each individual life, the basic sin behind all the particular sins: at this very moment
you and I are either committing it, or about to commit it, or repenting it. (Lewis
1962, 75)

Two connected objections to this eloquently seductive explanation are
in order. First, Lewis fails to account for the welling up of Pride in persons
who are currently enjoying the psychic realities of beatific bliss. In his
own description, the first such reality was direct awareness of God , perfect
communion, producing a Christ-like self. We imagine this condition would
involve the constant self-presentation of both God’s greatness and love.
The person would be in a constant state of something like what Rudolf
Otto named the mysterium tremens and overflowing love that the great
mystics have reported (Otto 1923). William James reported extensively
on the features of “saintly” experience, the fruits of which typically were
a constant sense of Higher Power, peace of mind, charity, bravery, love
of humanity, and so forth, and above all, the “permanent alteration of
character” (James 1961, 211–60). James records statements by mystics
such as John of the Cross and Teresa of Avila, both of whom wrote about
the incorrigibility of these experiences. John thought that a “single one
of them may be sufficient to abolish at a stroke imperfections of which
the soul during its whole life had vainly tried to rid itself” (James 1961,
324–5). The experience would “leave it [the soul] adorned with virtues
and loaded with supernatural gifts” (James 1961, 325). There is no need
to go on. All the way to Saul of Tarsus, and to Jesus himself, the examples
support thinking that anyone with the personhood of Augustinian Adam
would have only grown in wisdom, stature, and favor with people.
This objection is linked with a second one, which is that Lewis’s examples
are ordinary people, none of whom is supposed to have been in the beatific
state comparable to the purported original human condition. The welling
up of pride in “fallen” persons is unsurprising in itself, but surprisingly
irrelevant to the case.
Plantinga’s appeal to Pride takes a somewhat different turn. He suggests
that “perhaps a high probability of such a fall attaches to free creatures
(creatures with an area of autonomy) who were created in the image of
God” (Plantinga 2000, 211–13). Such creatures may naturally develop a
desire for God’s position. “Perhaps there is a high probability that beings
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created in the image of God will also wind up resembling him in this:
that they want to see and do see themselves as the center of the universe”
(Plantinga 2000, 213). Perhaps this “substantial probability” is “built into
the very nature of free creatures which have knowledge of God’s glorious
status and indeed do see it as glorious and desirable” (Plantinga 2000, 213).
Maybe there are possible worlds in which such creatures do not fall, but
perhaps these worlds are a small minority of the “totality of possible worlds
containing free creatures” (Plantinga 2000, 213). If so, then, “the fall isn’t
necessary, but perhaps its objective probability is very high” (Plantinga
2000, 213).
Plantinga’s explanation is provocative, but I think it fares little better than
Lewis’s. First, it fails to include the presumed original beatific condition
and personhood, including the features that would have prevented the
grandiose delusion he envisions. Second, however, if we propose that the
designed ontology of human persons comes with a high degree of “objective
probability” that they will fall this way, then we are back to original fragility
and the thought of evil due to divine design. His proposal resembles the
notion of “trans-world depravity,” which he originated years ago: it is
possibly true that in all possible worlds with morally free creatures that
those creatures eventually do something morally wrong (Plantinga 1976,
45–530).
Plantinga’s proposals in fact support a line of thinking that leads away
from the Augustinian tradition on human personhood. The name for it
is Supralapsarianism, which originally was a theory about divine election
defended by sect of Calvinism in the seventeenth century. They believed
God’s purpose in creation always was to save some people through Christ
and to leave the others in sin. We have just seen that Augustine himself,
when pressed, resorted to just this dialectical view of precosmic divine
purpose. Karl Barth’s treatment of the debate between supporters of
Supralapsarianism and Infralapsarianism (God’s decrees came only after
the un-decreed Fall) is perhaps the best in modern print, both for its
historical value and for the renovated version of Supralapsarianism that
Barth himself endorsed. In Barth’s version it always was God’s purpose
to elect everyone and everything in Jesus Christ, who reveals God as the
“electing God” (Barth 1967, 127–45). It is noteworthy that Plantinga has
recently adopted a version of Supralapsarianism in the debate over God
and evil, and we will return to his approach in a moment (Plantinga 2004).
But first we should point out that an ancient and authoritative precedent
for Supralapsarianism metaphysics exists in Christian history. Its main
source was Irenaeus of Lyon, who had a very different understanding of
original personhood in Adam. It seems that we would do well, especially
now in the context of Darwinian science, to consider Irenaean Adam for
the leading part in our play.
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IRENAEAN ADAM
According to Irenaeus, Adam and Eve could not have been morally and
spiritually mature, because it is in the very nature of such maturity that
it cannot happen apart from the course of a lifetime of moral choices
and experiences. According to J. N. D. Kelly, Irenaeus almost indisputably
adopted the view of Theophilos of Antioch that (so Kelly) “Adam was
infantile and undeveloped, and indeed this was why he was forbidden the
acquisition of knowledge (Kelly 2004, 168).
Yet there is no suggestion that this endowment amounted to what later theology
was to call original righteousness. On the contrary, being a creature, Adam was
necessarily far removed from the divine perfection and incorruptibility; an infinite
distance divided him from God. In Paradise, therefore, he was morally, spiritually,
and intellectually a child . . . . It is by a long process of response to grace and submission
to God’s will that Adam, equipped as he was with free choice, was intended to advance
towards ever closer resemblance to his Maker [italics mine]. (Kelly 2004, 171)

Irenaeus understood that such moral novices were no match for the
persuasive powers of the Devil (Serpent) (Lawson 1948, 202–3). Since
God is omniscient and wise, God must have known they would fail, and
yet God let them be tested anyway.
We have not mentioned divine foreknowledge, but we have seen that
it complicated things for Augustine on the metaphysics of the Fall. It
obviously complicates things for any Augustinian version of the account.1
At any rate, Irenaeus thought that the Fall must have been part of a
foreordained plan, and that the plan was for a better world than any other.
It would be a world brought to maturity and flourishing in and through the
Incarnation and the Atonement, the Person and Work of Christ. Matthew
Steenberg’s entire book, Irenaeus on Creation, makes this pervasive point,
which Irenaeus never captured more succinctly than in the statement,
“Since he [Christ] had pre-existence as a saving being, it was necessary
that what might be saved should also be called into existence, in order
that the being who saves should not exist in vain” (Steenberg 2008, 34).
It was in the nature and character of God, then, to bring about a world
that would emerge through divine victory over imperfections and evils. In
these metaphysics God authorizes the existence of evils for that purpose,
but is not the “author of evils” in the sense of being culpable for anything
wrong. In its totality, beginning to end, the creation is “very good,” and so
is God.

‘‘SUPRALAPSARIAN’’ GOODNESS
So there is in fact an alternative in orthodoxy to the Augustinian character
of Adam and the story of Paradise Lost. Plantinga in fact proposes that
Supralapsarianism may provide the best metaphysical framework in which
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to think about the existence of evils on theism (Plantinga 2004, 1–2). He
proposes that the acts of salvation in the Incarnation and the Atonement are
possibly the most valuable goods that could exist in any possible world—
for God, the First Being of the universe, to enter into human flesh, human
suffering, and abject humiliation on behalf of greatly less valuable, sinful
creatures, is as great in value as anything we can imagine (Plantinga 2004,
7). This leads Plantinga to affirm the “strong value assumption” (among
weaker others one could use), which is “any world with incarnation and
atonement is a better world than any world without it—or at any rate better
than any world in which God does nothing comparable to incarnation and
atonement” (Plantinga 2004, 10).
In this way of thinking the goodness of the original creation does not
consist of an original perfection, and maybe not even complete freedom
from disorder and natural evils, so called. The original goodness of creation
consists in its teleological place as a part in a historical-eschatological cosmic
whole. Moreover the goodness of God in authorizing such a world consists
in the great good of the world in its eschatological totality as a finished
work—one is inclined, as Lewis was, to turn to aesthetic agency and complex
works of art as moral analogies (Lewis 1962, 84). These points all apply to
original human personhood, too.
Along this line, I also submit that Plantinga’s account of Supralapsarianism and the goodness of God and the world is incomplete in an important
respect. The Incarnation and the Atonement do not generate cosmic value
by themselves in the abstract. They refer not only to divine actions but to
divine achievements in and through those actions—achievements of great
goods not just for God but for God’s creatures. Marilyn Adams has made
this point as eloquently as anyone in the analytical philosophy of religion.
In the book, Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God , the major thesis is
that for God to be good in relation to some person, God must be good
to that person, on the whole (Adams 1999). A complete treatment of
Supralapsarian goodness and purpose would include an account of how
the Incarnation and the Atonement achieved goodness for all creatures and
things, not least for human persons. Adams (like Lewis) also points the
way to an aesthetic understanding of God’s goodness and to the goodness
God achieves for creatures, especially human persons. I have also written
elsewhere on how this aesthetic Supralapsarian way might be taken by
Christian theologians (Schneider 2004, 2010).

PEACE AT LAST?
In closing, it should be clear that good theological reasons exist for getting
the Augustinian character of Adam and the drama of the Fall off the stage
and rewriting the script for an Irenaean part. Irenaeus’s approach to human
beginnings and personhood has several notable advantages. It provides
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a better framework for a Christian metanarrative that replaces Paradise
Lost and Paradise Regained with a more plausible (theologically speaking)
account of God deliberately forging a world via the triumph over conditions
of alienation and mortality for all creatures and things—a story of Christus
Victor. Furthermore, as John Hick proved years ago, the Irenaean approach
to theodicy has vastly more promise than the Augustinian Fall story does
(Hick 2007). And, finally, the Irenaean original person—Irenaean Adam—
fits remarkably well into the larger narrative of a Darwinian World and
Darwinian Adam. With a little imagination, the Irenaean figure can adapt
to the part naturally in unforced fashion.
If we are prepared to make these improvements in our theology of human
personhood, it may be that peace can break out between Christianity and
Darwinism, after all.
Other reasons exist for adopting an Irenaean character of Adam and
human personhood. It should also be clear enough that the Irenaean
character fits naturally into the wild Darwinian World and can adapt
on stage to the part of a Darwinian Adam. In the context of Christian
theology, theodicy, and engagement of evolutionary science, it would be a
wise and good thing to let “him” take the stage.
NOTE
1.
We have seen that it forced Augustine himself into a Supralapsarian explanation—God’s
two-aspect aesthetic glory revealed in full. We did not mention that Lewis also conceded a
similar Supralapsarian point—that is, that “in fact, of course, God saw the crucifixion in the act
of creating the first nebula” (Lewis 1962, 84). In that sense the Fall was part of a grand plan from
pre-cosmic beginnings. We must bypass his contention, in defense of genuine original freedom,
that either kind of world—one with or one without the Fall—would have been of equal value
(Lewis 1962, 85). If that is so, the question is why, then, did God not simply bring forth the
ones without it and spare creatures all the vast amounts, kinds, and distributions of suffering?
Finally, we must also ignore the famous controversy over compatibility between foreknowledge
and freedom, except to say that it is hard to see in this metaphysical scenario how original
human freedom could rise to the determinative degree required by the Augustinian explanation
of personhood and evils.
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